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Jennifer M. Kinsley* 
ABSTRACT 
When legislative bodies seek to solve problems, they do so in one of 
two ways: either they create entirely new regulatory frameworks that 
contain novel solutions and outcomes, or they expand existing statutory 
provisions by applying them in a different way.  Increasingly, legislatures 
are employing the latter approach to tackle today’s problems with 
yesterday’s statutory solutions.  This creative process of amending, 
expanding, and transferring outdated statutes to address current issues is 
called secondary legislation, and it poses unique challenges for existing 
constitutional law.  This is so because the existing standards for 
determining when a law violates fundamental rights fail to account for 
the existence of secondary legislation, instead measuring the 
constitutional validity of an enactment based solely on the text before the 
court.  As such, in weighing the constitutionality of a secondary statute, 
courts fail to consistently consider the historical meaning and application 
of predecessor enactments.     
This Article explores the concept of secondary legislation by examining 
the ways in which legislatures repurpose existing law and by questioning 
how the legislative recycling process fits within modern constitutional 
jurisprudence. Focusing on the governmental interests at stake when a 
legislative body borrows from old laws to create new ones, as well as the 
tailoring or nexus that is required when a legislature departs from a prior 
legislative tradition, this Article argues that the three primary 
constitutional tests–-strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational 
basis review–-should be adjusted to account for the modern-day 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
When legislative bodies seek to solve problems, they do so in one of 
two ways: either they create entirely new regulatory frameworks that 
contain novel solutions and outcomes, or they expand existing statutory 
provisions by applying them to new situations in a different way.  The 
former approach most commonly arises when either the perceived 
problem or the cause of the problem is new and when the legislative 
solution is the first attempt at addressing the issue.  Many of the laws 
regulating technology fall into this category,1 as do laws regulating the 
environment,2 public health,3 and gender identity.4  As society advances 
and creates unique problems—or comes to recognize problems for the 
first time that it previously ignored—legislative bodies must respond with 
brand new laws, written entirely from scratch. 
More commonly, however, legislatures attempt to tackle today’s 
problems with yesterday’s statutory solutions.  I call this type of 
legislative action secondary legislation.  Legislatures adopt secondary 
legislation when they amend, alter, or manipulate existing laws to apply 
them in a new way rather than drafting entirely original legislation to 
solve a current problem.  This may occur when the legislature observes 
that a law currently on the books has proven insufficient at curtailing a 
particular societal issue and, as a result, needs to be tightened or 
strengthened through a different style of enforcement.  Take, for example, 
the expansion of criminal penalties for drug dealing that were enacted 
during the 1980s.  The possession and sale of illegal narcotics had already 
been criminalized, but the government responded to perceived increases 
in drug use and addiction by simply amending the prison sentences 
associated with existing legislation rather than enacting new legislation to 
 
 1. See, e.g., Reno v. Amer. Civil Lib. Union, 521 U.S. 844, 857-58 (1997) (describing the 
Communications Decency Act, Congress’s first attempt to regulate content on the Internet). 
 2. For example, although now repealed, for a time the city of Raleigh, North Carolina banned 
new garbage disposal installations to protect the city’s sewer systems from kitchen grease.  See Adam 
Hochberg, Raleigh, NC Bans New Garbage Disposals, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (March 17, 2008, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88382453. 
 3. For instance, several cities have implemented so-called “sin taxes” on sugary sodas in an effort 
to discourage their consumption.  See, e.g., Karen Kaplan, Berkeley Sees a Big Drop in Soda Consumption 
After Penny-Per-Ounce ‘Soda Tax,’ LOS ANGELES TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016, 4:20 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-soda-tax-works-20160823-snap-story.html.    
 4. For example, the state of North Carolina recently enacted the Public Facilities Privacy and 
Security Act, known as the “bathroom bill,” in response to federal regulations that had the practical impact 
of requiring schools to permit students to use the bathroom that corresponds to their gender identity. See 
Franciscan Alliance, Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F.Supp.3d 660, 661 (D. N. Tex. 2016) (describing and later 
enjoining Health and Human Services Department regulation that expanded Title IX discrimination 
protection to gender identity); see also Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act (“House Bill 2”), 2016 
N.C. Sess. Laws 3 (repealed 2017).  The North Carolina law bans all individuals from using a public 
restroom that does not correspond to their biological gender.  Id.   
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address the problem.5   
Focusing on the government’s interest at both points in time—initial 
adoption and amendment—reveals some interesting observations.  For 
example, as the “war on drugs” example demonstrates, the government’s 
interest in addressing the target issue (in this case, combatting drug 
addiction and abuse) tends to be relatively static over time.  Stated another 
way, the underlying rationale supporting both the initial and amended 
laws tends to be, at its root, the same.6 As a result, when old laws are 
updated to address new problems, the government’s motivation in 
adopting the law seemingly transfers between the primary and secondary 
legislation. 
Secondary legislation may also be adopted, however, when the basis 
for the initial law and the basis for the secondary law are different or even 
incongruous.  Unlike the government’s interest in expanding its drug 
laws, in this instance the mere convergence of a legislative solution is not 
in and of itself indicative of an identical governmental motive.  What 
works to solve one problem might also work to solve another, even though 
the problems themselves are disparate and unique and even though the 
interest the government seeks to advance is different.  For example, 
governments frequently require licenses to participate in certain 
occupations—cosmetology and lawyering, for example7—but the reasons 
why these professions are regulated are vastly different.8 
  The practice of adopting secondary legislation by recycling old laws 
and by expanding, altering, or adjusting them in some way can therefore 
be broken down into several categories: (1) transferred secondary 
legislation, (2) combined secondary legislation, and (3) expanded 
secondary legislation.   
In the first category, transferred secondary legislation, a legislature 
 
 5. According to the Drug Policy Alliance, the number of people incarcerated for nonviolent drug 
offenses in the United States rose from 50,000 in 1980 to over 400,000 by 1997.  See A Brief History of 
the Drug War, DRUG POLICY ALLIANCE, (last visited Feb. 6, 2019), 
http://www.drugpolicy.org/issues/brief-history-drug-war.  
 6. While the outward rationale for adopting stricter drug laws appeared to be the “war on drugs,” 
some scholars and commentators have noted that the drug policy laws of the 1980s and 1990s were in 
some sense racially motivated.  See, e.g., Aliza Cover, Cruel and Invisible Punishment:  Redeeming the 
Counter-Majoritarian Eighth Amendment, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1141-43 (Spring 2014) (discussing 
racial disparities in drug enforcement and sentencing data). 
 7. See, e.g., K.R.S. 317A.020(2) (Kentucky law requiring a license to practice cosmetology, 
esthetic practices, and nail technology); Ky. Sup. Ct. R. 2.010 (Kentucky rule requiring a license to 
practice law and setting forth eligibility requirements for a law license).   
 8. Consider, for example, the legislative response to the fish pedicure, a treatment where the 
client’s feet are submerged in a pool of water containing fish which eat dead skin.  See Vong v. Aune, 328 
P.3d 1057, 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2014) (describing fish pedicure procedure).  The State of Arizona applied 
its existing sanitation laws to prohibit fish pedicures in nail salons.  Id.  Other states have followed suit.  
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may take an existing statute meant to address one type of problem and use 
it to address a different one.  This occurs, for example, when occupational 
licensing schemes are applied to new professions, e.g. requiring Uber 
drivers to obtain commercial driving licenses similar to taxi cab drivers.9  
In this circumstance, the government’s interest in regulating the new 
problem may not exactly mirror its interest in creating the legislative 
solution initially.  With respect to Uber and taxi drivers, for example, the 
desire to ensure transportation safety exists in both contexts,10 but the 
concerns around the migration of individual automobile insurance to part-
time commercial use of a vehicle and the government’s interest in 
ensuring proper background checks of moonlighting drivers and vehicles 
are unique to Uber.11  As a result, in cases of transferred secondary 
legislation, there may not be a perfect nexus between the government’s 
concern and the legislative solution it employs. 
  In the second category, combined secondary legislation, legislatures 
pull portions of scattered regulations together into a single, 
comprehensive bill meant to address a different subject.  This occurred, 
for instance, when Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection 
and Safety Act, which was designed to strengthen federal laws that protect 
against and punish child exploitation and abuse.12  Prior to the passage of 
the Adam Walsh Act, one federal law prohibited the possession and 
distribution of child pornography and another required sex offenders to 
register civilly, but these provisions were not necessarily perfectly linked 
with a common purpose in a single bill.13  The Adam Walsh Act closed 
this gap by providing comprehensive legal regulations applicable to all 
stages of sex offense cases, from pretrial release through sentencing.14  In 
this circumstance, the government’s interest in regulating sex offenses 
against children supported both the initial scattered enactments and the 
 
 9. See Harriet Taylor, Uber and Lyft are Getting Pushback from Municipalities All Over the US, 
CNBC (Sept. 2, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/02/uber-and-lyft-are-getting-pushback-from-
municipalities-all-over-the-us.html. 
 10. See, e.g., Jason Snead, Taxicab Medallion Systems:  Time for a Change, THE HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.heritage.org/transportation/report/taxicab-medallion-
systems-time-change (describing health, safety, and welfare regulations of taxicab industry). 
 11. Owain James, Uber and Lyft are Lobbying States to Prohibit Location Regulation, MOBILITY 
LAB (July 24, 2018).https://mobilitylab.org/2018/07/24/uber-and-lyft-are-lobbying-states-to-prohibit-
local-regulation/ (summarizing bases for local regulation of ride-sharing services and applications). 
 12. Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006) (codified as amended at 34 U.S.C. §§ 20911-20932 
(2012)).  
 13. See United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2009) (“Congress enacted 
the Adam Walsh Act in order to protect children from sexual exploitation and violent crime, to prevent 
child abuse and child pornography, and to promote Internet safety.  Its legislative history makes clear that 
the Act was designed to be a comprehensive bill to address the growing epidemic of sexual violence 
against children and to address loopholes and deficiencies in existing laws.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 523 F.Supp.2d 1025, 1027-28 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (describing 
bail conditions component of Adam Walsh Act); Tom, 565 F.3d at 499-500. 
4
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subsequent combined law.15 
Third, with expanded secondary legislation, legislators may take an 
existing statute intended to address a specific problem and expand or 
amend it in some way to further target the same problem.  The expansion 
of sex offender registration laws to require online disclosure and to 
prohibit residences near schools provides a prime example of this 
category,16 as do the increasing restrictions tied to firearm licensure.17  In 
all of these instances, legislatures enacting secondary legislation are not 
functioning in a vacuum, but instead inherit the benefit (or the burden) of 
the history, application, and outcomes of the initial statutory scheme.  
When operating in this category, governmental regulation tends to 
compound and expand upon itself, becoming progressively more 
pervasive in its application to daily life. 
This expanding legislative power is not necessarily, in and of itself, 
problematic.  Depending on one’s view on the proper role of government, 
legislation should in theory be responsive to current societal problems and 
should be adapted to reflect the values, knowledge, and understanding of 
modern society.18  The fact that legislative bodies may update, revise, or 
amend old laws to make them more relevant to current events may in 
some sense be a necessary function of the legislature.   
Where a concern arises, however, is how the judicial branch 
approaches secondary legislation that impacts constitutional rights.19  
Because the judicial branch acts as an important check of legislative 
power,20 it is crucial that the courts properly adjudicate the validity of 
 
 15. See Tom, 565 F.3d at 516 (discussing habits of child pornographers who use online 
distributions methods). 
 16. See, e.g., Does #1-5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 698 (6th Cir. 2016) (describing history of 
Michigan sex offender registration laws, which were amended multiple times over two decades to include 
an increasing array of restrictions). 
 17. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(3)(a) (requiring New York residents to apply for a 
handgun license in the city or county of their residence); Rules of the City of New York Title 38 (setting 
forth restrictions on handgun licensing, including requirement that individual seek only a place-based 
permit, allowing handgun possession at that specific location, or a carry permit, allowing only transport 
in public, but not both).  The constitutionality of the New York City licensing scheme will be considered 
by the Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 139 S. Ct. 939 
(Jan. 22, 2019) (granting petition for certiorari). 
 18. For a discussion of how the seemingly obvious point that legislatures should respond to 
contemporary problems might be the subject of contested debate, see Robert F. Blomquist, 
Overinterpreting Law, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1081 (2012). 
 19. Of course, legislatures enact statutes that do not touch upon constitutional rights all the time.  
For example, laws that prohibit speeding, regulate the provision of employer retirement plans, set sales 
tax rates, or define the duties and responsibilities of various government agencies typically do not 
encroach upon or impact constitutional rights.  While secondary legislation certainly occurs in these 
contexts, this Article is concerned solely with secondary laws that burden constitutional rights and are 
therefore infinitely more likely to wind up being subject to judicial review. 
 20. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 198 
(2012) (“At least since Marbury v. Madison, we have recognized that when an Act of Congress is alleged 
5
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both initial and secondary legislation, particularly where fundamental 
rights are at stake.21  Yet the various tests that have developed for 
assessing the constitutionality of a challenged statute do not explicitly 
account for the fact that secondary legislation derives from prior statutory 
enactments whose constitutionality is not challenged.  This is a problem.  
Courts cannot fulfill their constitutional obligation to review and, in 
appropriate cases, strike down legislative action if they do not accurately 
take into account the legislative process.   
When a court assesses the constitutionality of a particular law, it does 
so by weighing, with varying degrees of scrutiny, the government’s 
interest in solving a problem against the burden imposed by the 
regulation.22  Where a fundamental right is at issue, for example, courts 
ask whether the government has a compelling interest in addressing the 
perceived problem and whether the regulation is the least restrictive 
means possible of achieving the government’s objective.23  In cases 
involving lesser or less obvious rights, courts merely require that the 
statute rationally advance a legitimate government interest.24  In none of 
these instances does the court expressly weigh whether the initial 
legislative regimes would have been sufficient to solve the problem being 
addressed by the secondary legislation, how the government’s interest has 
morphed or changed between the initial and secondary legislation, or why 
the problem persists despite the government’s prior efforts to address it.25  
Rather, every piece of secondary legislation, at least insofar as it is 
analyzed under the existing constitutional framework, is treated on the 
same footing as its predecessors if challenged in court.  As such, courts 
rarely assess, at least not explicitly, whether prior versions of a statute 
were efficacious or what advantage new enactments further over prior 
enactments.26  Instead, by making use of existing constitutional standards, 
 
to conflict with the Constitution, it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.”) (citation omitted).  
 21. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (discussing fundamental nature 
of right to marry). 
 22. See, e.g., Judd Matthews & Alec Stone Sweet, All Things in Proportion? American Rights 
Review and the Problem of Balancing, 60 EMORY L.J. 797, 836-37 (2011). 
 23. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761 (2014). 
 24. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 25. This is not to say that some industrious or forward-thinking courts do not occasionally take 
into account the full scope of legislature’s motive in a particular case.  They do.  See, e.g., Does #1-5 v. 
Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 705-06 (6th Cir. 2016) (comparing current Michigan sex offender registration law 
to its predecessor for purposes of determining whether statue was punitive, and therefore barred by the Ex 
Post Facto Clause, or civil in nature).  But, as will be discussed later in this Article, the basic tests 
promulgated by the Supreme Court for assessing the legality of legislation restricting constitutional rights 
do not explicitly require lower courts to consider the legislature’s migrating or merged motivation. 
 26. See, e.g., NW Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Houston, 352 F.3d 162 (5th Cir. 2003) (evaluating 
constitutionality of amended and expanded adult business zoning restrictions without regard to whether 
initial buffer zones were sufficient to ameliorate perceived secondary effects of such businesses). 
6
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courts directly assess only whether the current version of the law is 
sufficiently justified and appropriately crafted to achieve its objective, 
meanwhile disregarding what came before the current version of the 
law.27  
  This approach to secondary legislative regulations creates distinct 
problems for constitutional jurisprudence.  First, by analyzing secondary 
legislation without regard for initial enactments, courts implicitly elevate 
and give undue weight to the government’s interest in solving the 
problem.  This is so because, under the interest prong of the various 
constitutional tests, courts take into consideration the legislative history 
documenting the existence of a problem, but do not weigh whether the 
government’s previous legislative attempts have ameliorated or 
intensified the current governmental concern.  In other words, nowhere in 
the analysis is the government required to demonstrate why its 
compelling, substantial, or reasonable interest persists despite prior 
attempts to address the problem.  As a result, the government’s interest is 
given too much deference and too little scrutiny, creating the possibility 
that a previously sufficient interest will be used to justify ever-expanding 
regulation over time.  Second, by analyzing the nexus between a 
secondary enactment and the potentially inflated interest without regard 
to the history of the prior enactments, courts give the legislative branch 
too much power to experiment with the regulation of fundamental 
rights.28  Indeed, at no point in the analysis is the government required to 
prove the efficacy of its prior enactments or to be held accountable for 
why they did not work.  Rather, courts merely focus on the present 
legislation, without regard for the fuller history that led to its passage. 
The Supreme Court has, to some extent, implicitly acknowledged this 
issue without giving any indication as to how its traditional constitutional 
frameworks should flex and bend when encountering secondary 
legislation.  Consider, for example, Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 
in which the Court weighed whether a Texas law requiring certain 
surgical center standards and the presence of a hospital transfer agreement 
for licensed abortion clinics imposed an undue burden on the right of a 
female to obtain an abortion.29  The law was not the state’s first attempt 
to regulate abortion access; its predecessor required that abortion clinics 
 
 27. The Supreme Court acknowledged as much in Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 
536 (2012), when it said of the Voting Rights Act: “the Act imposes current burdens and must be justified 
by current needs.” 
 28. The Supreme Court has acknowledged instances in which it gives legislatures a free pass to 
experiment with the regulation of activities involving protected constitutional freedoms.  See, e.g., City 
of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439 (2002) (observing that, in addressing the 
secondary impacts of sexually oriented businesses, “municipalities must be given a reasonable opportunity 
to experiment with solutions”) (internal citations omitted). 
  29.  136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300-01 (2016). 
7
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have a working agreement, rather than a formal contract, with a nearby 
hospital to provide care in emergencies.30  In determining whether the 
new law imposed an undue burden, the Court limited its inquiry to the 
sufficiency of the legislative history supporting the new law.31  
Significantly, in striking down the transfer agreement requirement, the 
Court observed that “there was no significant health-related problem that 
the new law helped to cure.”32  It thus focused on the period of time when 
the initial law was in effect but before the secondary legislation was 
adopted to assess the government’s interest.  Because the government 
could not demonstrate that a threat to women’s health persisted in the face 
of the predecessor law, the Court held that the new transfer agreement 
provision was unjustified and unconstitutional.33 
The Court’s opinion in Whole Women’s Health reveals why courts 
should expressly acknowledge a challenged law’s status as a secondary 
enactment before assessing its constitutionality. Of particular note is the 
Court’s implicit requirement that the government address efficaciousness 
before imposing a more burdensome restriction on protected 
constitutional rights.  Because the Texas law already in effect was 
apparently effective at protecting women’s health and minimizing 
emergencies, there was no new problem for the state to solve.34  As Whole 
Women’s Health reveals, secondary legislation must therefore address a 
new, persisting, or intensified problem to be valid, but the Court’s 
constitutional framework fails to expressly incorporate this requirement.35 
Against this backdrop, this Article explores the concept of secondary 
legislation and how the various constitutional tests should be adapted to 
address the secondary regulatory phenomenon.  Part I of the Article 
discusses the concept of secondary legislation, both generally and 
categorically, and offers concrete examples of how legislatures expand, 
amend, amalgamate, and recycle old legislation to solve new problems.  
Part II of the Article then discusses the various levels of constitutional 
scrutiny that apply to legislative enactments, including the variants of 
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review that exist 
in different constitutional contexts.  Part III questions how secondary 
legislation fits into the existing constitutional tests, paying special 
attention to the interest and tailoring prongs, and proposes adjustments to 
 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 2300-04.  
 32. Id. at 2311. 
 33. Id. at 2314 (“The record contains nothing to suggest that [the new abortion law] would be more 
effective than pre-existing Texas law at deterring” risky or unlawful abortions). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S.Ct. 1656, 1668-69 (2015) (discussing 
compelling government interest in restricting judicial campaign solicitations based on underinclusiveness 
and overinclusiveness but without regard to the novelty of the problem being addressed). 
8
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the constitutional standards that serve to take the history of a secondary 
piece of legislation into account.  Part IV includes context-specific 
examples of how the revised constitutional standards would work when 
applied to secondary legislative efforts and observes areas in which the 
Supreme Court has already implicitly followed these revised standards.  
The Article concludes that the government interest test should be applied 
with greater scrutiny in cases of secondary legislation and that the 
tailoring test should include an efficacy component that weighs the impact 
of prior legislation.   
II. CATEGORIES OF SECONDARY LEGISLATION 
The process by which modern-day legislation is drafted, vetted, 
debated, adopted, and enacted is complex and at times confusing.36  In 
today’s legislative environment, no law comes into fruition—whether it 
is proposed at the federal, state, or local level—without going through a 
number of back-and-forth drafts, committee hearings, and likely 
stakeholder reviews.37  The procedure can become even more 
complicated when the approval of two chambers is required, each of 
which may vote to add or subtract provisions of the bill.38  The result is a 
tangled web of moving parts, all of which must come together to form 
consensus in order for a proposed statute to become effective law. 
Perhaps because of the complexity of the current legislative process, 
legislatures do not always start from scratch in tackling a particular 
problem or issue.  Rather, legislatures frequently borrow from 
predecessor statutes, in both overt and nontransparent ways, to restructure 
regulatory regimes.  In this way, secondary legislation functions as the 
statutory corollary to judicial common law.  In the same way that case-
based jurisprudence is constantly expanding and building upon itself,39 
 
 36. For an interesting and informative discussion of the formalities of how a bill becomes law and 
the little-known “enrolled bill” doctrine, see Ittai Bar-Simon-Tov, Legislative Supremacy in the United 
States?: Rethinking the “Enrolled Bill” Doctrine, 97 GEO. L.J. 323 (2009).  Ronald Krotoszynski also set 
forth a detailed analysis of the Congressional law-making process and the constitutional requirements that 
govern it in Deconstructing Deem and Pass: A Constitutional Analysis of the Enactment of Bills by 
Implication, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1071, 1087-92 (2013).  
 37. See, e.g., How Laws are Made and How to Research Them,  https://www.usa.gov/how-laws-
are-made (last visited Feb. 10, 2019). 
 38. See, e.g., Alan Lowenthal, How a Bill Becomes Law,  
https://lowenthal.house.gov/legislation/bill-to-law.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2019) (describing conference 
committee process following passage of non-identical bills by the House and Senate). 
 39. To be fair, those who approach common law with a natural law perspective, and who believe 
that judges merely describe and name laws that already existed as an innate component of human virtue, 
may not see a resemblance between statutory creation and judicial common law.  For a more detailed 
discussion of this philosophy and the ways in which it may depart from the theory of secondary legislation 
espoused in this Article, see John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust, Chap. 1 and 3 (1981).  See also 
Robert P. George, In Defense of Natural Law (1999). 
9
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the broad array of federal, state, and local laws grows, broadens, deepens, 
and changes over time in a variety of categorical ways.40   
Understanding the reasons why a legislative body may elect to amend 
existing laws rather than draft new ones, as well as the ways in which 
legislatures borrow from other laws in the legislative process, is critical 
to fully considering the impact of the secondary legislation phenomenon. 
Three general types of secondary legislation exist:  transferred, combined, 
and expanded.  Each type is characterized by a different relationship 
between the initial enactment and the secondary law, leading to unique 
observations about the government’s interest for the secondary 
legislation.    
A. Transferred Secondary Legislation 
Transferred secondary legislation exists when a legislative body 
transfers an existing statute or regulation that applies in one context to an 
entirely different set of circumstances.  In these instances, the legislature 
may expand the existing statutory scheme to apply to a wider group of 
people, companies, or situations, or may adopt a new statute, carbon 
copied from the old one, that applies to the expanded issue.  By way of 
example, in the wake of crowdsourced transportation apps like Uber and 
Lyft, municipalities have explored the possibility of requiring 
crowdsourced drivers to obtain commercial driver licenses or to follow 
existing taxi cab regulations.41  Another example, although administrative 
rather than legislative in nature, is the Federal Aviation Administration’s 
recent expansion of the unmanned aircraft system registration 
requirement to include small unmanned aircraft, popularly known as 
drones.42 
In cases of transferred secondary legislation, the government’s interest 
in the initial law and the target of the second law may or may not be the 
same.  In the case of Uber drivers, for example, it is likely that the same 
concern for passenger and roadway safety that supported the initial 
commercial driver’s license law also supports requiring special licenses 
for crowdsourced drivers.43  But the government has additional interests 
in regulating Uber—namely the potential gap in insurance coverage when 
 
 40. Viewing the body of legislative enactments this way, as a web and not a strand, begs the 
questions:  why does our judicial system treat a statute as a stand-alone regulation, rather than in the 
context in which it was adopted, when exercising its judicial review function?  Why are statutory laws not 
treated by the courts in the same expansive way as common law?  These questions drive the discussion of 
constitutional test revision in Section IV, infra. 
 41. See Taylor, supra note 9. 
 42. 14 C.F.R. § 48.1 (requiring registration of drones with the Federal Aviation Administration 
effective Dec. 16, 2015). 
 43. See Snead, supra note 10. 
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private vehicles are used for part-time commercial purposes and the desire 
to promote fair competition between market participants44—that depart 
from its interests in regulating the taxi cab industry.  Similarly, when the 
FAA transferred its prior unmanned aircraft requirement to drones, it was 
likely acting to protect the safety and shared use of common airspace.45  
But, given the rapidly increasing recreational and commercial use of 
drones and the lack of a robust study of its potential dangers, the FAA 
was likely also seeking to discourage drone ownership in the short term 
until a full legislative solution could be debated and implemented.  The 
FAA may also have been acting to protect the privacy interests of people 
on the ground, whose activities and likenesses may, unbeknownst to 
them, be recorded by drones, a wholly unique interest from the reasons 
supporting the regulation of aviation more broadly.46   
As the Uber and drone examples demonstrate, it is not difficult to 
envision scenarios in which the governmental interest furthered by an 
initial enactment is not the same as the government’s interest in 
transferring an existing law to a new problem. As such, the mere fact that 
initial legislation is transferred to a secondary concern tells us very little 
about the nature of the government’s interest in the second statute.  The 
source of that information would be limited to the legislative record 
around the transferred enactment, rather than embedded in the initial 
legislation itself.   
B. Combined Secondary Legislation 
Combined secondary legislation exists when a legislative body pulls 
portions of different existing laws that target or relate to the same problem 
and combines them into a single bill that comprehensively addresses that 
problem.  This approach largely tracks the legislature’s perception of the 
severity of the issue being targeted.  As the problem grows in severity 
over time, so does the required legislative response.  While at first laws 
about other topics may contain only minor regulations that apply in 
narrow circumstances, amalgamating these disparate, scattered statutory 
provisions eventually leads to the conclusion that the problem warrants a 
 
 44. Our View: Uber Should Follow Taxicab Rules, IOWA CITY PRESS-CITIZEN (Apr. 1, 2016, 2:38 
PM), https://www.press-citizen.com/story/opinion/editorials/our-view/2016/04/01/uber-iowa-city-
should-follow-taxicab-rules/82520654/. 
 45. See, e.g., The FAA’s Drone Rules Are Effective Today, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,  
https://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=86305 (summarizing FAA Part 107 regulations on non-
recreational use of drones). 
 46. For a full discussion of how drones operate and place individual privacy rights at risk, see 
Jeramie D. Scott, Drone Surveillance: The FAA’s Obligation to Respond to the Privacy Risks, 44 
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 767 (2017), and Matthew Koerner, Drones and the Fourth Amendment:  Redefining 
Expectations of Privacy, 64 DUKE L.J. 1169 (2015). 
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more targeted focus.  The legislature then acts to combine the scattered 
provisions into a comprehensive law. 
This process was exemplified when Congress enacted the Adam Walsh 
Act, a broad bill designed to more precisely define and punish offenses 
related to child exploitation and pornography.47  Prior to enacting the Act, 
Congress already prohibited certain criminal offenses related to child sex 
abuse and child victimization, and also required a narrow range of sex 
offenders to sign onto a national registry as a collateral consequence of 
their convictions, but through two different provisions of the United 
States Code.  Reacting to the highly-publicized abduction and murder of 
6-year-old Adam Walsh,48 Congress enacted a single piece of legislation, 
which included expanded criminal penalties and collateral consequences, 
designed to punish sex offenses against children in a more comprehensive 
and serious way.49 
Unlike transferred secondary legislation, combined secondary 
legislation reveals at least some information about the government’s 
interest in both the old and new laws.  First, because the initial legislation 
contained only smaller subparts of the comprehensive bill, one can 
assume that the initial law was supported by a narrower governmental 
interest.  In addition, because the legislature has acted to combine smaller 
regulations into a larger, more focused enactment, it is also fair to assume 
that the government’s interest is stronger or more emergent with respect 
to the secondary legislation than it was with the prior enactments.  These 
observations are displayed in the Adam Walsh Act, which was enacted to 
address a heightened concern for protecting children following several 
highly publicized cases involving child victims.50   
In the case of combined secondary legislation, the persistence of the 
underlying issue in the face of the government’s initial enactment reveals 
something significant about the government’s ongoing interest.  Because 
additional combined legislation is necessary, in the government’s view, 
to combat the underlying problem the legislature is trying to solve, the 
adoption of a new law signals to some extent that previous legislative 
approaches were ineffective.  The serious sex offenses against children 
 
 47. Adam Walsh Child Protection And Safety Act Of 2006, H.R. 4472, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 
2006); see also Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL, 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/a/adam-walsh-child-protection-and-safety-act/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2019). 
 48. Adam Walsh’s father John was a prominent proponent of the expanded legislation.  He created 
and starred in the popular television show “America’s Most Wanted” to raise awareness of crimes against 
children and to increase apprehension of sex offenders.  Meg Grant, John Walsh, Host of ‘America’s Most 
Wanted,’ on What He’s Learned from Life and Loss, AARP THE MAGAZINE (Aug./Sept. 2013), 
https://www.aarp.org/entertainment/television/info-08-2013/john-walsh-americas-most-wanted.html 
(last visited May 20, 2019). 
 49. United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497, 499 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 50. Id. 
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that formed the impetus for the Adam Walsh Act are a prime example.  In 
that case, Congress’s previous attempts to deter the sex abuse of children 
by implementing criminal penalties and a public registry were not 
effective at eliminating child abuse altogether.  As a result, when adopting 
combined secondary legislation, the government maintains an ongoing 
interest at least in part because its predecessor solutions were ineffective.   
C. Expanded Secondary Legislation 
Expanded secondary legislation, the most common and easiest to 
identify form of secondary legislation, exists when the legislature amends 
existing laws in a way that broadens their scope or application.  In this 
regard, expanded secondary legislation is the most straight-forward type 
of secondary legislation because it arises with respect to a single statutory 
enactment, and both the initial and secondary legislation are codified in 
an identical location in the legislative code.51  The legislative body merely 
takes an existing law already on the books and alters or amends its 
provisions to make it more relevant to contemporary problems.  In such 
instances, the governmental interest underlying the amendments is 
typically obvious and very closely aligned with the interest that justified 
enacting the law in the first place.  But it is possible that the government’s 
interest has not really intensified, as was the case in Whole Women’s 
Health, and that the government is merely relying upon the same set of 
facts that justified its initial enactment to support increasingly 
burdensome regulation. 
One recent example of this type of legislation lies in the expanding 
licensing and regulatory requirements for gun ownership.52  As high-
profile mass shootings have been on the rise, certain states and 
municipalities have sought to restrict the types of firearms eligible for 
individual ownership, have lengthened wait periods and purchase 
conditions for gun ownership, and have tightened laws that disallow 
certain individuals from owning or possessing guns.53  In these cases, the 
government’s interest in expanding gun regulation is not difficult to 
discern.  Prior to the era of modern mass shootings, governmental bodies 
still regulated firearm possession, although through less stringent 
 
 51. Our system and study of law at least implicitly acknowledge the importance of this legislative 
trajectory because it is tracked by digital research databases like Westlaw and Lexis and is reported in the 
USCA.  For an example, search for “18 USC 2257” in Westlaw and scroll to the bottom of the legislative 
text to see a listing of the various amendments to the statute over time.   
 52. For a survey of handgun licensing laws and their justifications, see GIFFORD LAW CENTER, 
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/gun-owner-responsibilities/licensing/ (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2019). 
 53. Id. 
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regulatory schemes.54  They did so presumably to protect the public from 
the misuse of dangerous weapons, an interest they still seek to further in 
restricting firearm ownership to a higher degree.  While the interest may 
intensify or morph slightly over time, in instances of expanded secondary 
legislation, the government purports to pursue a substantially similar 
interest in both its initial and secondary activities.   
But it is equally possible that the government may seek to expand 
existing legislation without any new impetus at all.  Take, for example, 
adult business zoning.  It is not uncommon for municipalities to enact 
zoning laws that require adult bookstores and strip clubs to be located 
only in certain confined areas of town or to maintain a specified buffer 
zone from sensitive zones like schools, churches, and residences.55  But, 
at certain times, cities will either increase the buffer zone distance 
requirement or expand the range of businesses they consider as adult in 
nature without any change of circumstance on the ground.56  As this 
example illustrates, legislatures will at times amend a law despite the fact 
that the law is working well at addressing the initial underlying concern.   
D. The Interplay of the Categories of Secondary Legislation 
Secondary legislative action need not be cabined into a single 
subcategory. Rather, secondary legislation often involves a combination 
of one or more of the approaches discussed above. A prime example is 
the Adam Walsh Act, a combined secondary law, in which Congress also 
amended many of the provisions in the new law, making the law an 
example of expanded secondary legislation.57  However, determining the 
categorical composition of a particular secondary law is important for 
assessing how the law would be analyzed under the three primary 
paradigms guiding judicial review of the legislative branch.  This is 
particularly true in terms of identifying the nature of the government’s 
interest in its various legislative enactments.   
With transferred secondary legislation, the government’s interest is 
likely not identical between the initial and subsequent law.  With 
combined and expanded secondary legislation, the government’s interest 
is likely similar between the two laws, with the interest in the subsequent 
law being heightened in part because the government’s prior solutions 
 
 54. See Michael A. Bellesiles, Firearms Regulation: A Historical Overview, 28 CRIME & JUST. 
137 (2001) (summarizing historical trends in gun regulation from colonial times to modern day). 
 55. See, e.g., For the People Theaters of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 79 N.E.3d 461, 464 (N.Y. 
2017) (describing New York City regulation of adult businesses). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act Law and Legal Definition, US LEGAL, 
https://definitions.uslegal.com/a/adam-walsh-child-protection-and-safety-act/ (last viewed Feb. 10, 
2019). 
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proved to be ineffective at mitigating the societal problem at issue.  But 
the Supreme Court’s tests for analyzing the constitutionality of 
Congressional legislation treat transferred, combined, and expanded 
secondary legislation on identical footing with initial legislation, thereby 
failing to take into account the full picture of the government’s asserted 
interest.   
III.  JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF LAWS IMPACTING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
When courts assess the constitutional validity of statutes that infringe 
upon constitutional rights, they almost always do so by balancing, inter 
alia, two key components:  (1) the government’s interest in restricting the 
right (the “interest prong”), and (2) the degree of fit or tailoring between 
the regulation and the government’s stated interest (the “tailoring prong”).  
The strength of the right at stake and the nature of the government’s 
restriction of the right dictate the rigor of the analysis.   
A. Strict Scrutiny and Fundamental Rights  
Courts employ strict scrutiny—which operates as a presumption of 
unconstitutionality—in cases where either a fundamental right is violated, 
or the law strikes an unjust balance involving members of a suspect 
class.58  Strict scrutiny analysis requires that the law be justified by a 
compelling government interest of the highest order and that the interest 
is achieved in the most narrowly tailored way possible.  Examining the 
courts’ treatment of key fundamental rights reveals important 
observations about the point in time at which the government’s interest is 
assessed.  Without regard to the secondary nature of legislation impacting 
the right at stake, courts typically look solely to the legislative record for 
the challenged enactment and not any predecessor legislation to 
determine the constitutionality of the law at issue. 
1. First Amendment Right of Free Speech 
Laws that violate the various rights enumerated in the First 
Amendment59 are only constitutional if they survive strict scrutiny.60  In 
the context of free speech, laws must not ban or act as a prior restraint on 
expression on the basis of its content and must also necessarily advance a 
compelling government interest and be the least restrictive means of 
 
 58. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1268 (2008). 
 59. For example, the rights to speech and assembly. 
 60. See, e.g., Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (requiring strict scrutiny for all 
content-based restrictions on speech). 
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advancing that interest to survive constitutional review.61  As a result, at 
the outset, it is critical to determine the precise nature of the government’s 
interest in suppressing speech and whether the government is pursuing a 
content-based agenda in limiting expression. 
As discussed above, laws restricting free speech are rarely written from 
scratch.  Rather, Congress and its sister legislatures in the states tend to 
borrow from old solutions—licensing laws, criminal prohibitions, and the 
closure of quasi-public speech forums, to name a few—to address current 
perceived problems in the free speech marketplace.  One instructive case 
on this point is United States v. Stevens.62  At issue in Stevens was the 
constitutionality of a federal law that criminalized the creation, sale, or 
possession of certain depictions of animal abuse.63  The law was passed 
primarily to target the sale of so-called “crush videos,” which sexualize 
the torture of animals by depicting women in high heels slowly crushing 
animals to death, but Stevens was prosecuted for selling dogfighting 
videos online.64  Both the crushing of animals and dogfighting were 
illegal in all fifty states, evidence of the universal belief that the abuse of 
animals inflicts intolerable harm.65   
In attempting to justify the law, the government in Stevens argued in 
favor of what the Court termed a “startling and dangerous” proposition:  
that depictions of animal cruelty, while not historically excluded from the 
protections of the First Amendment, could now be wholly excised from 
free speech coverage.66  The government equated expressions of animal 
cruelty to other categories of speech, like child pornography and 
obscenity, that are so lacking in societal value as to fall outside the 
protection of the Constitution.67  And, more broadly, the government 
suggested that the value of any particular category of expression—not just 
depictions of animal abuse, but any speech deemed by the government to 
be unlawful—could be balanced against is harm to society to assess the 
scope of the First Amendment.68  
Given its parallels to bans on child pornography and obscenity, 
Congress’s prohibition of depictions of animal cruelty was, in effect, a 
piece of transferred secondary legislation.  By arguing that the identical 
balancing and historical tests that justified other laws banning speech 
applied equally to crush videos, the government was in a sense relying 
 
 61. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); United States 
v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 62. 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 63. Id. at 464. 
 64. Id. at 465-66. 
 65. Id. at 466. 
 66. Id. at 469-70. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
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upon its interests in the initial legislation to support the transferred 
secondary legislation.  But the Court emphatically rejected this 
proposition.69  The Court refused to separate that speech which is 
constitutionally protected from that speech which is not covered by the 
First Amendment solely on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis.70  While 
the Court acknowledged that speech which is categorically unprotected 
generally lacks serious value and inflicts serious harm, it noted that those 
qualities were descriptive, rather than objective.71  Moreover, the Court 
declined to carve out a new category of unprotected expression, despite 
the government’s invitation to do so.72 
By cabining its inquiry to the government’s interest in the transferred 
legislation, the Court missed an opportunity to engage in a comparative 
analysis of the asserted compelling interest, weighing the interest in the 
secondary legislation against the interest in the original legislation.  The 
Court rejected the government’s attempt to impose a cost-benefit analysis 
on the right of free expression,73 thereby skirting the question of whether 
the stated legislative purpose in removing offensive expression regarding 
animal abuse from the public discourse was compelling.  Had the Court 
instead weighed the interest underlying the initial child pornography 
legislation—the protection of children from revictimization as images of 
their sexual abuse spread from possessor to possessor—against the 
interest in prohibiting depictions of animal abuse, which was limited to 
the promotion of sanitized public communication, the Court likely would 
have reached the same result, but in a manner that acknowledged the 
existence of secondary legislation. 
 2. Voting Rights 
 Citizens of the United States arguably have a fundamental right to vote 
in public elections,74 yet it is undeniable that voting discrimination 
against people of color persists even today.75  Congress attempted to 
remedy the undeniably rampant historical racial discrimination in voting 
when it adopted the Voting Rights Act of 1965.76  One provision of the 
Act required states which utilized a reading test, good moral character 
standard, or other voting barrier that imposed a disparate impact on racial 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 470-72. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. U.S. Const. amend XV. 
 75. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 536 (2013) (“voting discrimination still exists; no one 
doubts that”). 
 76. Id. at 537. 
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minorities to submit to additional federal regulation of its election 
processes.77  Under those regulations, the offending states were not 
permitted to make changes to their elections procedures without federal 
preclearance from either the Attorney General or a three-judge panel in 
Washington.78  The preclearance provision expired in five years, but was 
renewed by Congress in 1970 for five years, in 1975 for seven years, in 
1982 for 25 years, and in 2006 for another 25 years.79  A county located 
in Alabama, a historically offending state subject to the preclearance 
requirement, sued to invalidate the 2006 extension.80 
The Court considered the question in Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder.81  
In assessing the constitutionality of the Act, the Court clearly understood 
its secondary nature, heavily discussing the voting discrimination 
problems that supported the adoption of the Act in the first place.82  But 
the Court did something interesting in weighing the validity of the 2006 
extension against the original justification for the Act in 1965.  It noted, 
first, that the Act had appeared to all but eliminate racial disparity in 
voting:  “Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically . . . In 
the covered jurisdictions, voter turnout and registration rates now 
approach parity.  Blatantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are 
rare.  And minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.”83  
The Court attributed these advancements to the Act, an achievement 
Congress itself acknowledged when it passed the 2006 extension.84  
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 537-38. 
 79. Id. at 538-39. 
 80. Id. at 536, 539. 
 81. See id.  
 82. Id. at 537-39, 545-46.  The Court had previously upheld the Voting Rights Act against a 
constitutional challenge in 1966 after it was initially enacted.  South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 
301 (1966).  The Shelby County Court described that ruling as follows: 
 
In 1966, we found these departures from the basic features of our system of government justified. 
The “blight of racial discrimination in voting” had “infected the electoral process in parts of our 
country for nearly a century.”  Several States had enacted a variety of requirements and tests 
“specifically designed to prevent” African–Americans from voting.  Case-by-case litigation had 
proved inadequate to prevent such racial discrimination in voting, in part because States “merely 
switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees,” “enacted difficult new 
tests,” or simply “defied and evaded court orders.”  Shortly before enactment of the Voting Rights 
Act, only 19.4 percent of African–Americans of voting age were registered to vote in Alabama, 
only 31.8 percent in Louisiana, and only 6.4 percent in Mississippi.  Those figures were roughly 50 
percentage points or more below the figures for whites. In short, we concluded that “[u]nder the 
compulsion of these unique circumstances, Congress responded in a permissibly decisive 
manner.”  
 
Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 545-46 (internal citations omitted). 
 83. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 547. 
 84. Id. at 548 (“There is no doubt that these improvements are in large part because of the Voting 
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Given that the Act had proven to be efficacious, the Court then required 
the government to demonstrate that it had an ongoing interest in 
eliminating voting discrimination when it adopted the 2006 law.  The 
Court therefore implicitly segregated the government’s interest in its 
initial enactment and the government’s interest in the expanded secondary 
legislation.85  Because the government could demonstrate no ongoing 
compelling interest in light of the original Act’s success, the 2006 
extension was declared unconstitutional.86 
The Court’s decision in Shelby County provides a roadmap for how and 
why constitutional scrutiny should expressly acknowledge the secondary 
legislation phenomenon.  Governments will attempt from time to time to 
rely upon outdated evidence and old solutions to solve current problems, 
if they exist, or to justify heavy-handed legislation based on improper 
regulatory motives.  The Court’s existing constitutional tests simply do 
not account for this phenomenon, although they should. 
B. Intermediate Scrutiny 
When laws target a class that is not race-based, but is derived from a 
historically suspect classification,87 or when laws do not ban but merely 
burden the exercise of a fundamental right,88 courts apply intermediate 
rather than strict scrutiny.  Under intermediate scrutiny, the government 
need only maintain a substantial, rather than a compelling, interest and 
enact a law that is narrowly tailored to further that interest.89  In addition, 
when laws restrict free expression, the government must also show that 
sufficient alternative avenues for the presentation of speech must remain 
after the regulation is enforced.90     
 
Rights Act. The Act has proved immensely successful at redressing racial discrimination and integrating 
the voting process.”) (emphasis in original); Id. at 547 (“Those conclusions are not ours alone. Congress 
said the same when it reauthorized the Act in 2006.”). 
 85. I categorize the 2006 extension as expanded secondary legislation because, as the Court 
observed, it extended the initial coverage period significantly and imposed additional burdens on 
historically offending states.  See id. at 549. 
 86. Id. at 551-53.  Notably, the Court rejected the government’s attempt to rely upon solutions 
derived from data collected in 1965 to justify identical and expanded solutions in 2006.  Id. (“Coverage 
today is based on decades-old data and eradicated practices…. But history did not end in 1965 . . . 
Congress—if it is to divide the States—must identify those jurisdictions to be singled out on a basis that 
makes sense in light of current conditions. It cannot rely simply on the past.”). 
 87. See, e.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982) (describing 
intermediate test for gender discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause). 
 88. See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (establishing intermediate scrutiny 
test for time, place, and manner restrictions on speech). 
 89. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989). 
 90. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
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1. Lesser Speech Restrictions91 
a. Time, Place, and Manner Analysis 
In contrast to laws that ban or criminalize speech on the basis of its 
content, which are presumptively unconstitutional, laws that merely seek 
to regulate the delivery of free speech in some lesser way are reviewed 
with intermediate and not strict scrutiny.  Known as time, place, and 
manner restrictions, these types of laws are constitutional if they are 
content-neutral, advance a substantial governmental interest, are narrowly 
tailored to that address that interest, and keep open ample alternative 
channels of communication.92  In this context, the reduced burden on the 
government to demonstrate a substantial rather than a compelling interest 
makes it more likely that the interest used to justify a challenged 
regulation will be derivative of the initial justification.  It is therefore 
critical that courts separate original legislation from secondary legislation 
to appropriately identify the vitality of the government’s current 
objective.   
In a typical time, place, and manner case, the government’s asserted 
interest is unrelated to the expression at issue.93  For example, in United 
States v. O’Brien, the seminal First Amendment case on intermediate 
scrutiny, the government argued that its interest in issuing and 
maintaining records related to the draft supported its prosecution of a man 
who destroyed his draft card in protest.94  The objective of the law, if the 
government was to be believed, therefore had very little to do with 
prohibiting speech, but instead was focused solely on the administration 
and efficiency of the draft.  This is dissimilar from laws that ban speech 
outright, which the government typically attempts to justify by reference 
to the categorical lack of value of the speech itself.95 
Given the potential that the government may engage in the pretextual 
censorship of unpopular speech by relying upon a justification that is 
unrelated to speech, it is critical that courts correctly pinpoint the interest 
that is actually advanced by a particular piece of legislation.  When 
secondary time, place, and manner legislation is added to the mix, that 
observation matters all the more. 
 
 91. The term “lesser speech restrictions” refers to governmental regulation of speech that does not 
amount to an outright ban and is therefore reviewed under an intermediate scrutiny test.  See, e.g., Ward, 
491 U.S. 781. 
 92. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 93. Of course, this must be the case, because laws that target expression because of their content 
run the risk of being invalidated as impermissibly content-based.  See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 
2218 (2015). 
 94. 391 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1968). 
 95. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
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b. Eminent Domain 
Although not a variant of intermediate scrutiny per se, the 
governmental interest required to support a taking of private property for 
a public use approximates the substantial governmental interest portion 
of the intermediate scrutiny test.  In the context of property takings, the 
government may not appropriate physical or personal property for its own 
use.96  Where the government does take private property, it must both 
offer just compensation to its owner and act in pursuit of a public 
purpose.97  Whether a government’s asserted objective is a sufficiently 
public purpose to justify a taking is substantially similar to the question 
of whether a government’s interest is sufficiently substantial to burden a 
fundamental right. 
The Court’s opinion in Kelo v. City of New London98 offers a prime 
example.  At issue in Kelo was the taking of private residences and other 
investment properties, none of which were blighted or in serious disrepair, 
to facilitate a Connecticut town’s economic development plan.99  In 
concluding that the plan constituted a public purpose, the Court credited 
the legislative body’s determination that removing the homes and 
replacing them with commercial businesses was in the municipality’s best 
interests.100  In so doing, the Court acknowledged that legislative 
solutions change over time as conditions in society and on the ground 
change as well.101  “Viewed as a whole, our jurisprudence has recognized 
that the needs of society . . . have evolved over time in response to 
changed circumstances.”102   
Times indeed change, and the law sometimes changes with them.  In 
such circumstances, the courts should recognize that current legislation is 
derivative of its predecessors and should consider the full slate of 
legislative action in determining whether a law is constitutional. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY OF SECONDARY LEGISLATION 
Despite the Supreme Court’s apparent understanding that laws should 
be responsive to current, not prior, problems, the existing tests for 
 
 96. Tahoe–Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
324 (2002). 
 97. U.S. Const. amend. V; Penn Central Transp. Corp. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978). 
 98. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
 99. Id. at 475-76. 
 100. Id. at 483-84 (noting that the city’s “determination that the area was sufficiently distressed to 
justify a program of economic rejuvenation is entitled to our deference”). 
 101. Id. at 482. 
 102. Id. 
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measuring the constitutional validity of a statute fail to take into account 
the full history and complexity of secondary legislation.  More 
specifically, in considering whether government regulations violate a 
constitutional right, courts consistently apply an identical level of scrutiny 
to initial and subsequent regulations without taking into account previous 
regulatory activity.  This is true regardless of whether the court is applying 
strict or intermediate scrutiny or deferential rational basis review.     
A. Governmental Interest Test 
Regardless of whether a statute implicates strict or intermediate 
scrutiny or lesser rational basis review, the first task a court must 
undertake in considering a statute’s constitutionality is to determine the 
nature of the government’s interest.  The court asks: What is it the 
government is looking to accomplish?  What concern does the 
government have and what is the basis for that concern?  It is essential 
that the interest be properly defined, because the interest prong is the 
benchmark against which the remaining constitutional standards—and 
the tailoring prong in particular—are assessed.  
This task proves difficult enough in cases where the government 
approaches the legislation in question with a fresh brush.  Indeed, 
competing schools of thought have arisen on the question of statutory 
intent and the respective roles that legislative history, societal context, 
critical legal theory, the competing meaning of language, and the text of 
the statute itself play in determining why a legislative body chose to enact 
a particular law.103  But the task is all the more complicated when the 
question of legislative intent involves two or more separate legislative 
records, supporting two or more separate pieces of legislation, as is the 
case with secondary legislation.  Perhaps because it may be difficult to 
determine what role the legislature’s intent in adopting a predecessor 
statute should play, if any, in defining the government’s interest in a 
secondary law, courts have never articulated an interest test that 
accommodates secondary legislation. 
This is problematic.  Because secondary legislation, particularly of the 
combined and expanded varieties, arises almost always from an 
intensified or heightened governmental response, there is a risk that courts 
will view the second law to be more justified than it actually is.  This is 
so because the government may attempt to use, as it did in Shelby County, 
the full legislative record from both the initial and secondary enactments 
 
 103. For a comprehensive overview of the various schools of thought in the field of statutory 
interpretation, see Jonathan R. Siegel, Judicial Interpretation in the Cost-Benefit Crucible, 92 Minn. L. 
Rev. 387 (Dec. 2007). 
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to justify its interest.104  Without identifying the derivative status of the 
new legislation, courts may be too quick to accept the government’s vast 
body of evidence without questioning whether the secondary law is truly 
supported by its history. 
More importantly, in some instances, secondary legislation may only 
be necessary or desirable because the government’s initial attempt to 
solve the problem was not successful.  When this is the case, the 
government does not retain a heightened or more serious interest in 
addressing the underlying problem than supported its initial enactment, 
although it may argue that it does.  Rather, the necessity of secondary 
legislation merely demonstrates that the government was ineffective in its 
first solution.  But it is easy to confuse this failure with a more emergent 
need to act.  The government may appear justified in its need to respond 
with a more burdensome regulation, when in reality all it needs to do is to 
try something different, not something more.   
In other instances, the government may attempt to rely upon the exact 
set of facts and circumstances that justified its initial enactment in 
adopting more burdensome regulations.  This occurs most frequently, as 
it did in the Shelby County voting discrimination case, in the case of 
expanded secondary legislation.105  In the absence of new evidence 
demonstrating that there is a necessity for additional legislation, the 
government’s interest should be deemed insufficient, given that its initial 
solution appears efficacious.  After all, if the government has been 
effective at solving the problem, it maintains no ongoing interest in 
regulating the conduct or behaviors that caused the problem in the first 
place.  Therefore, the Court’s implicit holding in Shelby County—that the 
government must justify continuing interests at each enactment of 
secondary legislation—should be explicitly applied in similar cases 
addressing First Amendment, due process, and other protected 
constitutional rights.    
  One approach to the secondary legislation problem would be to 
require courts to assess the strength of the government’s interest based on 
the entirety of the legislative record for both the initial and secondary 
enactments.  Where the initial legislative solution failed, courts should 
say so.  Where the initial legislative solution was supported by a different 
or more robust interest, courts should say so as well.  In fact, the Supreme 
Court implicitly employed a similar approach with respect to abortion 
rights in Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, a case questioning the 
constitutionality of a Texas law requiring abortion providers to maintain 
 
 104. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 565 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“After 
considering the full legislative record . . . .”). 
 105. See, e.g., id. at 559 (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion).  
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hospital transfer agreements.106  In Whole Women’s Health, the Court 
rejected the notion that the state of Texas retained a sufficiently 
compelling interest in keeping abortions healthy and safe in light of the 
fact that it had previously amended its laws to restrict abortion access.  In 
other words, because the state was unable to show that a mortality risk 
persisted even after more stringent regulations were enacted, the state 
lacked a sufficiently compelling and new interest to justify its secondary 
legislation. 
As a result, efficacy should be a necessary component of the 
government interest inquiry.  Where the government has previously 
legislated to solve a problem, and the challenged enactment is merely 
secondary to that initial legislation, the government’s interest is 
necessarily tethered to the success or failure of its previous initiative.  
B. Tailoring Test 
The phenomenon of secondary legislation also makes it difficult to 
accurately assess the degree of tailoring, or the nexus, between the 
government’s stated interest and the burden of the right at stake.  An 
efficacy component also addresses this particular problem as well.  More 
specifically, before determining whether the new law promotes the 
government’s interest in a constitutionally justifiable way, courts should 
consider the prior law and its impact on the issue that the government was 
initially attempting to address.  Rather than questioning whether the 
secondary law is tailored to the government’s newly asserted interest, 
courts should instead focus on the degree to which the prior law was 
effective.   
Take, for example, the regulation of Uber drivers, which is derivative 
of pre-existing regulations of taxi drivers.  Prior to the existence of Uber 
and other crowdsourced transportation services, local governments 
routinely required special licenses of taxi cab drivers.107  To test the 
efficacy of these regulations, government entities licensing taxis could 
presumably draw upon their experience, anecdotal evidence, and data, if 
available, to demonstrate a nexus between licensing programs and 
improved passenger safety.  Requiring new regulations of Uber drivers to 
be justified by the government’s own experience in licensing cab drivers 
ensures that secondary legislation is appropriately and narrowly tailored 
to the government’s objective. 
 
 106. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 107. See, e.g., ATLANTIC CITY, N.J., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 233-2 (imposing strict licensing and 
operational regulations upon owners and drivers of taxi cabs). 
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V. SAMPLE CASE STUDY 
A hypothetical scenario based on real-life regulation is illustrative of 
how a more comprehensive view of secondary legislation is appropriate.  
Municipalities frequently adopt zoning regulations designed to keep 
sexually oriented businesses away from sensitive uses in the community 
(i.e. schools, residences, and places of worship).  Because the right to 
disseminate erotic expression is protected by the First Amendment, cities 
may only adopt such laws when they are targeting the documented 
secondary effects of adult businesses and not the content of the material 
sold inside.108  In demonstrating that it is targeting the secondary effects 
of adult businesses and not punishing them for their expression, cities are 
permitted to rely upon evidence from other jurisdictions showing that 
crime rates, property values, and neighborhood cleanliness are negatively 
impacted by the presence of these businesses.109  It is impermissible, 
however, for municipalities to act solely out of a desire to prevent an adult 
business from opening its doors in their town.110 
To protect their citizens from the perceived secondary effects of 
sexually oriented establishments, cities frequently adopt buffer zones that 
prohibit such businesses from operating within a specified number of feet 
of sensitive uses.111  It is not uncommon for cities to later expand the 
distance requirement, at times to be responsive to changing physical 
landscapes on the ground.  For example, shifting residential patterns 
might necessitate expanding a 1,500-foot buffer zone to a 2,500-foot 
buffer zone to ensure that adult businesses are not congregating where 
people tend to live.112 
Contemplate a scenario, however, where a municipality expands its 
buffer zone absent any factual support.  For example, consider that the 
city of Anytown adopted an ordinance in 1995 that prohibited adult 
businesses from operating within 1,500 feet of churches, schools, and 
residences.  In doing so, it relied upon studies from other jurisdictions 
demonstrating that crime rates increase and property values decrease in 
 
 108. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda 
Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002). 
 109. See, e.g., Encore Videos, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 330 F.3d 288 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing 
permissibility of reducing crime and stabilizing property values as justifications for adult business zoning 
ordinance); World Wide Video of Washington, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(identifying pornographic litter and public lewdness as secondary effects of adult businesses the 
government is permitted to regulated consistent with the First Amendment). 
 110. See, e.g., Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981). 
 111. See, e.g., For the People Theaters of N.Y., Inc. v. City of New York, 79 N.E.3d 461, 464 (N.Y. 
2017) (describing New York City buffer zone ordinance, which required adult uses to locate no closer 
than 500 feet from enumerated incompatible uses). 
 112. See, e.g., Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d 164, 169 (3d Cir. 1997) (describing 
legislative history of local reduction of adult business buffer zone from 500 feet to 300 feet). 
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areas that are immediately adjacent to strip clubs.  Fast forward to 2001, 
when three new council members who comprise a majority of the council 
are elected.  The new council members review the identical studies 
presented to the Anytown council in 1995 and conclude that the initial 
buffer zone was insufficient to protect the public from the secondary 
effects of adult uses.  The Anytown council therefore passes a new 
ordinance requiring adult businesses to locate more than 5,000 feet from 
sensitive uses.113   
If the expanded buffer zone faces constitutional challenge, how should 
the courts apply intermediate scrutiny to the 2001 ordinance?  Can 
Anytown demonstrate that it retains a substantial interest in targeting the 
secondary effects of adult businesses based solely on the 1995 legislative 
record, or is it required to submit additional proof that an expanded buffer 
zone was needed in 2001?  Must Anytown show that its 1995 ordinance 
was ineffective at addressing the identified secondary effects before 
expanding its legislation to be more heavy-handed?  And how are the 
courts to determine if the 2001 ordinance is narrowly tailored, given that 
Anytown clearly felt a less rigorous regulation was sufficient to solve the 
problem in 1995? 
This example illustrates the unique conundrums that arise when courts 
assess the constitutionality of secondary legislation and the ways in which 
the government interest and tailoring prongs of the three forms of 
constitutional scrutiny can be tweaked to produce a more comprehensive 
treatment of legislative validity.  In some instances, the modified 
approach will result in legislation being struck down that previously 
would have been upheld, but in others it will result in legislation 
remaining in full force where it may have been declared unconstitutional.     
Critics of this approach may argue that adjusting the interest and 
tailoring prongs of constitutional scrutiny for secondary legislation places 
too high a burden on the government to justify both its current and prior 
enactments.  But, considering the previously-asserted government interest 
and the efficacy of the prior regulation may actually make it more likely 
that a statute will be upheld in its secondary form.  This is particularly 
true where the first legislative attempt at regulation results in a statute 
being struck down and where the legislature adopts a more tailored 
secondary law.  Take, for example, the Child Pornography Prevention 
 
 113. This hypothetical is based upon a similar fact pattern that occurred in New York City.  In 1995, 
the city adopted an adult business zoning regulation based on a study that highlighted the depressed 
conditions in Times Square, purportedly caused by the presence of seedy strip clubs and adult bookstores 
in the area.  In 2001, the city expanded its 1995 ordinance to include a broader range of businesses, 
including those which dedicated less than 40 percent of their floor space or business purpose to adult 
entertainment.  The City relied upon no new evidence of secondary effects to justify the expanded 2001 
ordinance.  The validity of that enactment is currently facing constitutional attack in federal court.  See 
689 Eatery Corp. v. City of New York, No. 1:02-cv-4431 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jun. 12, 2002). 
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Act, which was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.114  Following the Free Speech 
Coalition decision, Congress amended its law to more narrowly define 
the range of suspected or possible child pornography to be targeted, and 
this law was upheld as constitutional.115  As a result, proper adjudication 
of the government interest and tailoring prongs of the various 
constitutional tests is more, and not less, likely to generate legislative 
enactments that both solve contemporary problems while also respecting 
individual rights. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In today’s complex legislative world, rarely is a law drafted and 
enacted completely from scratch.  Rather, the practice of creating 
secondary legislation by amending, expanding, combining, and 
transferring old laws into new ones has become the legislative norm.  Yet 
our system of judicial checks and balances has failed to adjust to this new 
standard and still maintains constitutional tests that were created to 
adjudicate only first legislative attempts to solve problems.  These tests 
are largely unworkable when called upon to address a tangled legislative 
web in which statutes morph and broaden into one another over time, as 
is the case with secondary legislation.  This is particularly true when 
courts attempt to assess the government’s interest in adopting new 
legislation derived from prior enactments and supported by a potentially 
new goal.  This is also true with respect to a court’s tailoring inquiry, 
which examines the effectiveness of a challenged secondary law without 
regard to the efficacy of its predecessors.   
In assessing the constitutionality of secondary legislation, courts 
should expand their interpretation of the government interest and tailoring 
prongs to include the full legislative and pragmatic history of the prior 
laws on which the secondary law rests.  Indeed, secondary legislation does 
not arise in a vacuum, and nor should its scrutiny.  Instead, judicial review 
should look to the complete legislative history of a secondary enactment, 
with its infinite benefits and lessons, to determine the law’s viability. 
The Supreme Court implicitly employed this approach in its recent 
voting discrimination and abortion rights decisions, but without 
intentionally adjusting its stated constitutional tests for analyzing 
restrictions on fundamental rights.  Given its propensity to weigh the past 
against the present, the Court should amend the standards for 
constitutional review to outwardly embrace a law’s secondary status and 
 
 114. 535 U.S. 234 (2002). 
 115. See United States v. Williams, 535 U.S. 285, 290-91 (2008) (upholding constitutionality of 
PROTECT Act amendments to Child Pornography Prevention Act). 
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adjust its analysis accordingly. 
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